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Motivation
Over the last decades, research has mainly focused on the labor market implications of migration. Most attention has been given to migrants displacing natives in terms of wage or employment, or both. Several scholars have shown that, whereas a certain replacement effect in the labor market is found for lower levels of skills and education (Venturini & Villosio, 2006 , Dalla Zuanna & Weber, 2011 Ottaviano & Peri, 2012; Dustmann et al., 2013) , migrants do not necessarily negatively affect native workers' wages and their probability of transition from unemployment to employment (Gavosto et al., 1999; Venturini & Villosio, 2006; Ottaviano & Peri, 2012) . In addition, recent studies focusing on female migrants working as housekeepers or as care workers has demonstrated that female migrants are complementary to native highly-skilled females in the labor market. In other terms, migrant women allow native women to work for more hours (e.g. Barone & Mocetti, 2010 , Cortes & Tessada, 2011 , Ferre, Gonzales, Ortega, 2011 and to reduce their traditional early retirement practices to take care of elderly parents (Romiti & Rossi, 2011) . These considerations involve countries where the family is largely responsible for family services and where men still invest little time in housework and care activities. Previous studies suggested that the growing presence of migrant women positively affects the life of many families, enabling native women to stay in the labor market while providing domestic assistance for elderly or sick relatives. Nevertheless, the question of whether and how natives' family dynamics are affected by the increasing presence of female migrants, has scarcely been explored We wish to study this question here by focusing on the effect of (female) migrants on the native marriage market. Research has noted that the divorce rate tends to be higher when there is a surplus of marriageable women (Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993) . Migration often brings just such a surplus women, and these women may be a factor in the breakdown of native marriages.
In addition, if the supply of women increases, men who earlier were not able to find a marriage 4 partner may now find one. Sarret and Vitali (2015) , after all, have shown that the increasing presence of foreign women means an increase in mixed marriages, helping to balance the contemporary loss of marriages among natives. Overall, we hypothesize that the increasing presence of female migrants facilitates the disruption of established couples and favors the formation of new couples. This (new) framework of divorce and remarriage may be especially valid for men with lower education, who may prefer a female partner used to traditional (and subordinate) gender roles.
In this paper, we outline this approach by addressing the former part of the argument, namely whether the size and the composition of the female migrant population in a certain area affects the dissolution of native marriages. We take Italy as a case-study because it exemplifies a malebreadwinner society, and because it is a relatively new immigration country.
The Rationale of the study
A model for the interplay between marriage market and migration
We can usefully compare the marriage market to a labor market. Let us imagine that there is a bundle of goods and services provided in a marriage, e.g., shirt ironing, food preparation, company, protection, sexual intercourse, and so on. Within this market there are two types of agents: the first who demands marriage services; and the second who provides marriage services. In our model, the first are men and women are the second. There are limitations to this old-fashioned model. There may be cases where women demand and men provide; there are same sex couples; and many other dimensions, but this stylized model should help in depicting marriage dynamics 1 .
Formally, to get marriage services, the demander, has to provide remuneration R. The higher the remuneration needed, the lower the demand. The demand function is thus down sloping:
where QmsD are the amount of marriage services demanded, which depend on Q0,the level of marriage services demanded when the remuneration R is set tat 0, and a, a propensity to consume marriage services that multiplies the remuneration R.
The supply of marriage services, provided by women in the case at hand, increases with the remuneration granted by marriage. The decision to abandon single life and enter into marriage implies new duties -such as ironing, cooking and having sex -that may be differently valued by different women, i.e. they have different reservation costs 2 . Hence, some women will be ready to enter into the marriage market with the return of a lower remuneration than others.
Indicating with b the propensity to offer marriage services, and with Q1 the level of marriage services offered when the remuneration is set to 0, the total quantity of marriages supplied QmsS is equal to:
The higher the remuneration, the larger the supply.
The match between supply and demand determines the equilibrium amount of marriages
Qe and the equilibrium market remuneration Re. Formally:
The demander is not discriminating among suppliers, thus he is unable to provide different returns for different suppliers, and the market defines both the equilibrium return Eo, which implies the remuneration Re and the level of equilibrium marriages Qe (Figure 1 ).
It is straightforward to extend this stylized representation of the marriage market in order to include the dynamics linked to marital dissolution, which eventually leaves space for a new union. Within this system, we expect that the changing levels of equilibrium remuneration facilitate the disruption of established couples. We hypothesize that for an established match (a marriage), as the aspirations of women increase, leading to an increase in their reservation remuneration, the gain that the man receives from that union decreases. In this changing 6 scenario of costs and opportunities, the demander of marriage services -i.e. the man -sees the stimuli to continue the match reduced. . This corresponds to an increase in the total amount of marriage services to Q'e. The new equilibrium remuneration R'e, which is lower than that of the previous situation, will not be sufficient for some native women with high reservation remunerations. Hence, some of them may decide to abandon the match, or the male partner may decide not to provide such high remuneration, choosing a more affordable option.
This changed scenario implies that the total number of native marriages will decline from Qe to Qn: This shift represents marriage disruption. Conversely, the difference between Q'e and Qe represents new (mixed) matches.
Note that in this representation (Figure 2 ) foreign women hold the same reservation remuneration distribution as native women, thus the new supply function of marriage services S'ms has the same slope as the previous one. Nevertheless, the reservation remuneration of foreign women might be better set at a lower level than that of the native women, because they are more in need of remuneration. In this case, the new supply function will be steeper, the reduction of the equilibrium remuneration larger, and the displacement of native women in the marriage market even greater. even if they hold high human capital, are generally unable to get a return on it because, for instance, of insufficient knowledge of the language, or because of difficulties in accessing a qualified job. Thus, migrant women are likely to compete in the marriage market with less educated native women: who, in general, match less educated men. In our model, we, therefore, expect the situation described in Figure 2 to be verified especially among agents with low levels of education. We anticipate that the increasing presence of foreign women would be particularly disruptive for marriages formed by spouses with lower educational attainments 3 .
The Feminization of Migration in Italy
Internationally, there is great interest in the Italian context. This interest stems, first, from the dramatic family changes that Italy has witnessed over the last two decades. Among other family changes, the total divorce rate increased from around 115 (divorces per 1,000 marriages) in 2000 to 182 in 2011 (Istat, 2012) . Second, Italy is a country with a long history of emigration, but a relatively short history of immigration.
In the 1970s, Italy was chosen, above all, as a destination by migrant men coming from Northern Africa and Albania; women were a small part of the total stock of migrants and about 80% of them entered Italy to accompany or join family members as caregivers (Del Boca & Venturini, 2014) . In more recent years, women represent the vast majority of migrants coming from Eastern European countries, South America and the Philippines, whereas men are overrepresented among migrants coming from, for example, Northern Africa, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Table 1 ; see also Reynaud & Conti, 2011) . In addition, the presence of female first movers for work characterizes these decades: their presence reached 40% of total entrances around 2010 and they represent the principal wage earners for themselves and their families (Forbes Martin, 2004) . Source: Istat (2012) Most migration studies have been gender-blind, focusing on men as the main actors of migration and paying little attention to women. Even when women's migration was recognized as an empirical phenomenon, little attention was paid to women moving to a new country for work (Cooke, 2008; Kofman, 2011) . The case of women's migration toward Italy offers a crucial example of the double meaning of the "feminization of migration". Feminization refers to the increase in the quantity of women who migrate; it points, too, to the transformation of women in transnational mobility from movers for family reunification to first movers looking for a job (Di Bartolomeo & Marchetti 2013) .
The increase in the number of women first movers toward Italy is essentially attributable to the expansion of the demand for family services, in particular for the care of elderly and sick relatives. Insufficient support from the national welfare system obliges the family to undertake these services. This goes, hand in hand, with the family culture of the country, which relies on female labor for the production of labor-intensive family services. Altogether, this state of affairs has been sustained with the hiring of additional female labor. Such demands becomes even more pressing in the context of a rapidly ageing society and the increasing need for a second income in the household to face day-to-day family expenditures. Looking at the labor market role of foreign women in Italy, Barone and Mocetti (2010) showed that migrant women are complementary to highly-skilled native women, and even increase their labor supply, thanks to this external family services production. Romiti and Rossi (2011) argued, indeed, that foreign women workers reduce the probability that native women will quit the labor market (retiring early) in order to take care of elderly parents and relatives. Importantly, the hiring of "family helpers" is not limited to high-income families; the need for a second income has pushed medium and low-income families to look for external help in housework and care, while the female spouse is now active on the labor market.
Altogether, female migrants contribute to a social model of the family as the main producer of care services. In the following we might reasonably ask: does the increase of available women also affect the marriage market? In particular, we wish here to test whether the widespread presence of migrant women correlates with a higher probability of marriage disruption in Italy.
Analytical Strategy
Data and Sample Selected
We use data coming from the Italian "Family and Social Subjects" survey (FSS), carried out by the Italian National Statistical Office (Istat) proportional to their population size and without replacement; whereas the households were drawn with equal probabilities and without replacement. Respondents were interviewed faceto-face. The overall response rate of the survey was over 80%. 
Statistical Model
We estimate a set of discrete-time event history models to study the hazard of a de facto separation. We follow marriage until de facto separation occurs or, alternatively, we censor the observation in cases of widowhood or by date of the interview. Since data about foreign residents are available only for more recent years, the analysis is left-censored, i.e. This procedure implies that we have repeated measures for each individual, thus implying that observations on the same subject are not independent. Moreover, our data are hierarchically structured, with individuals living in different regions, with different marital disruption patterns and different migration levels. To account for dependence among observations and among regions, we adjusted the estimates utilizing robust standard errors (Cleves et al. 2008 ).
Individual-level covariates
In our models we accounted for the duration of the marriage -that represents our baseline duration -including two terms: a variable continuous in years and a quadratic term. Then, we considered a range of additional covariates. As basic demographic controls, we included gender (coded 0 for men and 1 for women) and birth cohort (grouped into: 1 = 1945-54; 2 = 1955-64; 3 = 1965-74;4 = ≥1975) . Previous analyses for Italy have also shown that the presence of children reduces any separation risk, because they tend to be considered as couple-specific capital (De Rose, 1992; Vignoli & Ferro, 2009) . We thus included a time-varying variable indicating whether the respondent has children (1 = yes).
Educational qualification has been proved to be powerful source of variation in disruption risks in Italian marriages (De Rose, 1992; Vignoli & Ferro, 2009) . We thus created the following educational attainment groups: primary (1); secondary and upper-secondary (2); and post-secondary and tertiary (3). In addition, as proxy for the family background, we considered parental education (1 = if at least one parent holds a university degree). The parents' 13 educational level may be understood as an indicator of the socio-economic level of the childhood place of residence (Billari & Ongaro, 1999) . In addition, higher education among parents may also reflect exposure to more liberal attitudes, and acceptance of divorce among their offspring (Vignoli & Ferro, 2009 ).
Aggregate-level covariates
Female migration indicators represented our main explanatory aggregate-level variables in the assessment of the hazard of de facto separation. Our aggregate-level indicators were temporally lagged by one year: this means that they were measured one year prior to the event of interest (i.e. de facto separation), thereby allowing a proper temporal ordering of events.
In a preliminary analysis, we tested a large set of indicators distinct by single country of origin and/or area of origin: e.g. Europe, Asia, North America, Latin America, and Africa. In several cases, they proved not to be significant, thus, beside the presence of the total stock of resident female foreign population, we limit the presentation to those reporting a significant association with the outcome variable: the female resident foreign population coming from certain Latin American countries (namely, Peru, Cuba, Colombia, Argentina, and Venezuela), and from some Eastern European countries (Poland, Russia, and Belarus).
Finally, in order to account for differences across regions and across time, we included, in the equation, other variables for the regional labor market context. There was, first, the longterm unemployment rate, to give a sense of the structural characteristics of the labor market in each region. It is often used interchangeably with a simple regional fixed effect. Second, we considered the employment rate, and aimed to identify the time trend for each region. Given its cyclical nature, this indicator is often used to proxy annual time dummies. Third, we included the gross domestic product (expressed in millions of Euros purchasing power standard) to capture contingent regional variations, which have not yet been transformed into occupations. 
Results
Effects of aggregate-level migration indicators
Effects of other covariates
All the coefficients of the other control variables included in the model (see again Table 2) show the expected sign (De Rose 1992; Vignoli & Ferro 2009 ), which provides an indirect general validation of the statistical model itself. By looking together at the two variables describing the baseline duration, as marriage duration increases, the risk of separation is reduced to a certain point, when it slows down again. The risk of marital dissolution is slightly higher for younger cohorts. Having one or more children, as expected, significantly reduces the likelihood of de facto separation. Educational level is not significant. This is in line with recent papers showing a weakening of the negative educational gradient in marriage dissolution (Matysiak, Styrc, & Vignoli 2013) , and this also applies to contemporary Italy (Salvini & Vignoli 2011) . Also, family background, measured through the parental educational level, does not appear to be statistically significant.
The three contextual variables included in the model do not result statistically significant. It is worth noting that they did not display any effect even when they were included separately in the estimate. Nevertheless, they have been retained in the model in order to account for Italian regional heterogeneity.
Educational differentials
In order to get deeper insights into the effects of the aggregate-level of migration on Italian separation risk, we re-ran previous models stratifying by level of education. For the sake of simplicity, we put higher education (tertiary) against medium and low education (secondary and lower). Table 3 reports the results. Note: All models are controlled for variables listed in Table 2 .
The models estimated for sub-groups of Italians with a high level of education do not show immigrants having a significant effect on marital dissolution. None of the indicators about female migration considered display statistical precision. On the contrary, for less educated people the risk of de facto separation increases as the presence of foreign women coming from Latin America and Eastern Europe becomes more relevant. Again, the magnitude of this association is rather moderate (0.32 and of 0.16 percentage points, respectively for the two geographical areas, both significant at the 10% level). This result is interesting, considering that educational level did not represent a significant discriminant on the risk of marital dissolution for Italians on average (see Table 2 ).
Robustness checks
Our findings may not be valid without a series of sensitivity checks. First, instead of data from the registry of foreign resident population, we estimated similar models relying on a different source for migration data, namely the registry of residency permits. The pattern of results remained virtually unchanged: the results are not shown, but they are available upon request from the authors. Nonetheless, the residency permits dataset presents some caveats: it includes information by gender starting only from 2006, and people coming from some Eastern European countries are excluded from the determination of residency permits in most recent years, because of their entry to the European Union. Hence, we decided to present only results from the registry of the resident foreign population.
Second, we claim that there is no endogeneity at play between migration and marriage dissolution dynamics. In fact, it is worth stressing that, of course, immigrants comes to Italy for work, without any intention of altering the Italian marriage market. Nonetheless, we conducted a robustness check to scrutinize the potential endogeneity between rising female migration and union dissolution. If the relationship were spurious -that is, if we observed a positive link between the presence of female migrants and union dissolution because the two phenomena are increasing in parallel -one should naturally detect the same pattern among male migrants. In this robustness check, male migration indicators thus represent our main explanatory aggregate-level variables in the assessment of the hazard of de facto separation:
and, we also tested a large set of indicators by single country of origin and/or area of origin.
Interestingly, we found that none of the models including the male component of foreign presence illustrates significant effects on marital dissolution risk of natives (Table 1A ). This result confirms that the association between women's migration and the marital disruption of natives is not spurious.
Third, we considered a large series of aggregate-level covariates describing different sources of variations between regions. We tested several combinations between activity, employment and unemployment rates, distinguishing between male and female indicators, long-term unemployment rates, diffusion of higher levels of education, different measurement scales of gross domestic product, as well as regional fixed effects. Any specific combination between them did not substantially change the results (Table 1B) . The three selected variables were chosen in light of their relevance in describing the economic characteristics of the Italian regions.
Concluding remarks
This paper focuses on the interplay between migration and the marital dissolution of Italians.
We asked whether aggregate migration shocks alter the marriage market. Our findings suggest that they do. We show, indeed, that the higher the foreign female presence, the higher the dissolution risk of established marriages. The composition of women's migration is especially relevant. Our outcomes suggest that the increasing presence of women first movers (especially those coming from Latin America and Eastern Europe) is associated with increasing separation risks. Although the magnitude of disruption risk is relatively low, the evidence suggests that the growing presence of female migrants may disrupt native marriages.
Our study may thus stimulate new perspectives. The presence of "family helpers" -very often women first movers -has traditionally been considered as an element contributing to preserve the Italian welfare system, where its first and most important pillar is the family itself.
In this context, while foreign women tend to be complementary to Italian women in the labor market (Barone & Mocetti, 2010; Romiti & Rossi, 2011) , helping to fulfill household and care work, they also seem to affect the stability of native marriages. The association between the presence of migrant women and marital dissolution was found to be relevant especially for less-and medium-educated individuals. Thus, migrant women may be in competition in the marriage market with Italian women, perhaps particularly less educated Italian women.
To conclude, this analysis offers new insights into family changes in recent immigration countries. Empirical studies concentrating on individual-level factors affecting marital dissolution risks -such as marriage duration, presence of children, or women's educationhave a long tradition (e.g., Amato & Rogers 1997; Härkönen & Dronkers 2006; Lyngstad & Jalovaara 2010; Matysiak, Styrc, & Vignoli 2013) . But the study of contextual-level determinants for divorce is much less well established. In this paper, we propose a potentially new, and never investigated, contextual correlate of marital disruption. We suggest the relevance of migrants as a potential driver of new family life courses, at least for Italy; with effects depending on country of origin. Our results need to be read as pointers for further research, whether they can be extrapolated remain to be seen.
1 For a more detailed analysis of the marriage market from an economic point of view, see Grossbard-Shechtman (2003) . In Chapter 1 the author employs a similar model, but she did not analyze migration. The imbalances in the marriage market were also considered by Guttemberg and Secord (1983) , but again they did not consider any macro level shock.
20
2 We define the reservation cost as the cost that a partner has to put up with to enter into a marriage. The remuneration has to be higher than the cost. This definition is inspired by the reservation wage, or the money that a worker has to receive to accept to enter into the labor market. 
